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Abstract: 
Disasters are, by their nature, very complex phenomena. Their modelling using a systematic and 
logical methodology can help us identify their root causes and may facilitate in allocating 
appropriate resources to prevent such situations. Although techniques exist to model such 
phenomena, a single off-the-shelf model is insufficient to provide an effective and realistic 
analysis to prevent disasters due to its inherent assumptions. In order to overcome these 
limitations of single methods, this article proposes a hybrid model of four methods to optimise a 
safety investment. First, a hierarchy is constructed with a problem structuring approach. 
Secondly, a new graphical representation, the Crisis Tree Analysis (CTA), is introduced to 
visualize how a combination of basic events may lead to a disaster. Thirdly, the criticality of 
each event is assessed using the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). Finally, a mathematical 
programming model is proposed to calculate the optimal allocation of available funds in order to 
avoid the disaster. A case study of the Bhopal disaster is used to illustrate the proposed four-step 
method. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is generally observed that the senior executives in companies are concerned mainly with the 
profitability of their plants/factories. This concern sometimes translates into a decision where 
safety-related investments appear redundant and non-productive. However, the matter of fact is 
that industrial accidents regularly happen and sometimes lead to severe human injuries and 
environmental consequences. Modern history is marked by many such memorable disasters: the 
Mt. Blanc tunnel fire (Vuilleumier et al. 2002), BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore 
Drilling (Skogdalen and Vinnem 2012), Challenger and Columbia explosions (Paté-Cornell and 
Dillon 2001), Chernobyl (Lindell and Perry 1990) and Fukushima (Gallucci 2012) to name few. 
Strategic investments are therefore necessary in order to avoid, or at least minimise the risks of 
having such disasters in future.  
The precautionary safety measures are often expensive and uncertain; companies usually do not 
have unlimited resources (e.g. staff, goods, capital). Therefore allocating resources in such a 
constrained situation turns out to be a complex decision making problem. The complexity of this 
problem is primarily due to the subjective nature of risks e.g. it is quite difficult to quantify and 
control the quality of maintenance or the propriety of management. Although several techniques 
exist to address such type of problems, each method has its limitations when used in isolation. 
Some of these techniques include: Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) (Ferdous et al. 2011, Ahmed et al. 
2011, Khakzad et al. 2011), Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Paulos and Apostolakis 1998, 
Linkov et al. 2006, Steele et al. 2009), Multi Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) (Apostolakis and 
Lemon 2005, Cox 2002), Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) (Youngblood 1998, Todinov 2006), 
Bow-tie (Khakzad et al. 2012), Bayesian network (Khakzad et al. 2011, Khakzad et al. 2013b, 
Khakzad et al. 2013a), etc.  
A stand alone approach may jeopardise the safety issues because the integral modelling of the 
complex situation is not captured. Therefore, a recent trend is to combine these techniques 
[Postprint version] Please cite as : Ishizaka A, Labib A, A Hybrid and Integrated Approach to Evaluate and Prevent 
Disasters, Journal of the Operational Research Society, 65(10), 1475–1489, 2013 
 
3 
 
together e.g. Event Tree, Fault Tree Analysis and Bayesian Updating (Rathnayaka et al. 2011b, 
Rathnayaka et al. 2011a, Rathnayaka et al. 2012); Fault Tree Analysis and Fuzzy Sets (Ferdous 
et al. 2009b); Event Tree and Fuzzy Sets (Ferdous et al. 2009a); Bow-tie and Fuzzy Sets 
(Ferdous et al. 2012, Ferdous et al. 2013).  
The objective of this paper is to propose a multiple, yet integrated, approach to model and 
prevent failures by an optimised and effective resource allocation. The proposed approach 
facilitates the identification and quantification of all possible risks and also suggests the optimal 
allocation of resources in order to mitigate them. The successive phases of the proposed 
approach are: 
1. A problem structuring method to build the hierarchy of issues leading to a disaster. 
2. A Crisis Tree Analysis (CTA), which graphically display the combination of facts or 
basic events that may lead to an accident and a Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) which 
helps analysts to visualise the system functionality and critical components. 
3. An adaptation of the Analytic Hierarchy Process in order to quantify the likelihood that a 
basic event will happen.  
4. A knapsack resource allocation, which optimises the investment in safety measures 
within each basic event. 
This article will first describe these methods and then its application on a case study, namely the 
Bhopal disaster. 
2. INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK 
The four successive phases (Figure 1) of the new conceptual framework are described in this 
section. Each method used in isolation has its strengths and limitations (Table 1). The problem 
structuring method is descriptive and helps analysts to understand the problem under 
consideration. However, being non-prescriptive, it does not solve the problem itself. Similarly, 
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the Fault Tree Analysis is a graphical representation of basic elements but does not provide a 
criticality index of each element. A progress is made here with the introduction of a new 
method, Crisis Tree Analysis, which provides an ordinal severity of the crisis. However, the 
cardinal priority can only be captured with the Analytic Hierarchy Process method. AHP, 
however, cannot capture the combination of the basics events. A knapsack optimisation can 
optimise resource allocation but the importance of intangible resources and its connection needs 
to be defined a priori with another method. Figure 1 explains the input-output connection of each 
methodology. It is to note here that an experienced user may skip the FTA step and directly 
jump from problem-structuring to CTA. FTA and CTA are similar, apart from the existence of 
an additional logic gate (revolving gate) in CTA. The revolving gate can be used in the crisis 
tree diagram to measure the severity of crisis.  
To conclude, each of the discussed methods has its strengths and limitations. In this paper, we 
propose an integration of all these methods in order to use their strengths and cancel their 
limitations. The next sections will explain each method in detail.  
Methods Strengths Limitations 
Problem structuring The nature of the problem and its 
structure is modelled with a 
systematic and complete method. 
The method is only descriptive, not 
prescriptive. 
FTA The combination of the basic 
events is graphically modelled. 
The criticality of the event cannot 
be quantified. 
CTA The combination of the basic 
events is graphically modelled and 
an ordinal severity of the crisis is 
measured. 
A cardinal criticality of the event 
cannot be quantified. 
AHP The criticality of the basic events is 
quantified. 
The combination (AND/OR) of the 
basic events cannot be defined. 
Knapsack 
optimisation 
The resources allocation is 
optimised. 
Intangible resources cannot be 
quantified and the combination 
(AND/OR) of the resources cannot 
be defined. 
 Table 1 : Strengths and limitations of the safety modelling methods 
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Problem structuring
Fault Tree Analysis
Rich verbal 
structured 
problem
Crisis Tree Analysis
Logical 
combination of 
basic elements
AHP
Ordinal intensity 
of the crisis
Knapsack optimisation
Risk prioritisation 
of basics events
Optimised resources 
allocation
 
Figure 1: Input-output relationship between each methodology 
 
2.1. Problem structuring 
Structuring decision problems is often described to be the first and most important step towards 
making a rational decision. The structuring process transforms an ill-defined problem into a set 
of well-defined elements, relations and operations. Basically, the main goal of problem 
structuring is to develop a formal representation of the contributory factors in the decision 
problem that also includes the views, opinions and values of multiple decision makers. Problem 
structuring is not a solution-oriented approach, rather an approach to find the constituents of the 
problem.  
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A popular way to structure the problem is the hierarchical approach, which leads to more 
manageable sub-problems. The output of hierarchical problem structuring methodology is a 
better understanding of the problem which in turn acts as a pre-requisite, or an input, for 
subsequent methodologies used in the proposed integrated approach as shown in Figure 1.  
 
Output: A rich verbal structured problem. 
 
2.2. Crisis tree analysis  
CTA represents graphically the combination of basic events or facts leading to a crisis. This 
technique is a further development of FTA. FTA has been widely used as a safety and reliability 
tool for complex systems (Zio et al. 2008, Joshua and Garber 1992, Martins and Maturana 2010, 
Thekdi and Lambert 2011). In both analyses, the undesired event is placed on the top of the tree 
and its children represent the basic events. These basic events may occur due to human errors, 
equipment failure or environmental interference. Tree analysis provides a logical representation 
of the relation between the top event (usually the main disaster) and the basic events. Its 
construction is always top-down, starting from the main undesired event and then developed 
downwards with the causes making the basic events of the tree. In FTA, the AND and OR gates 
are sufficient enough to describe most of the situations: a machine works or does not work. 
However in CTA, the output is not always binary. The magnitude of the crisis may vary 
depending on the number of active inputs.  
For example, consider the following three events (Figure 2) and their consequences: 
1) an uncontrolled manipulation lead to a lethal explosion, but the location is far away from 
habitations, and evacuation procedures are in place. Only one basic event occurs, it is a 
crisis of severity level 1. 
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2) an uncontrolled manipulation lead to a lethal explosion, location is close to habitations, 
but evacuation procedures are in place. Two basic events occurs, a higher number of 
persons are possibly killed than in case one. It is a crisis of severity level 2. 
3) an uncontrolled manipulation lead to a lethal explosion, location is close to habitations 
and no evacuation procedure is in place. Three basics events occurs, the number of 
victims is possibly much higher than in the two previous cases. It is a crisis of severity 
level 3.  
 
Figure 2 : Example of graph with a revolving gate 
 
The number of events occurring has clearly an impact on the severity of the crisis. Therefore, we 
have introduced the new gate REVOLVING (Table 2), where the output indicates the level of 
the crisis. The logic table of this new gate is given in Table 3. As the output of the revolving gate 
can be greater than 1, the logic table is extended in case this output feeds to another gate. 
Symbol Gate name Description Inputs 
 
REVOLVING 
The output occurs if any of its input event happen and 
is amplified with its number 
≥ 2 
Table 2: REVOLVING logic gate 
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Input 1 Input 2 Output REVOLVING 
0 0 0 
1 0 1 
0 1 1 
1 1 2 
n 0 n 
0 n n 
n m n + m 
m n m+n 
Table 3: Logic table of the REVOLVING gate 
 
CTA is a powerful method for diagnostics and problem finding because it follows a logical and 
systematic process of breaking down a complex system into its root causes. Not only does it 
analyse the physical parts of the system, but also considers the intangible events including, for 
example, human skills and quality of the evacuation procedure. In practise, each event in the 
hierarchy may not have the same probability of occurrence. CTA is inherently a qualitative 
analytic tool and therefore, a quantitative method must also be incorporated to estimate these 
probabilities. This hierarchical analysis can be reused in the AHP method to quantify the priority 
of each basic event. 
 
Output: A graphical modelling of the logical combination of basic events. 
2.3. Reliability Block Diagrams  
RBD are systems that are substantially equivalent to the crisis tree diagrams. Unlike the FTA 
model, RBD is a success oriented model: it looks at the combination that leads to system 
functionality. Each block in the RBD represents an actual functioning component. In RBD, the 
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system fails when the connection between input and output is totally interrupted i.e. all the 
possible paths from input to output are interrupted/blocked (Corporation 2007). Blocks could be 
arranged either in parallel or series. A parallel structure corresponds to an AND logic gate in the 
crisis tree diagram, whilst the series format corresponds to an OR logic gate. The new 
REVOLVING gate indicates the severity level of crisis. Its representation in RBD is a block 
series as in the OR gate but with an additional hyper-block covering each entry. The hyper-block 
is green if its entry is connected with its output. If a connection between input and output of the 
hyper-block is missing, it will turn red. The number of red hyper-blocks indicates the severity 
level of the crisis. Table 4 summarizes the conversion.  
Gate name Structure Representation 
REVOLVING 
Green or red      
hyper-block 
1 2
 
Table 4: Reliability Block Diagram representation of the REVOLVING gate 
 
 
Output: A graphical success oriented modelling of the logical combination of basic events. 
 
 
2.4. Analytic Hierarchy Process 
AHP is a multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) method that helps the decision maker in 
solving a complex problem having multiple conflicting criteria (Saaty 1977, Saaty 1980, 
Ishizaka and Labib 2009). AHP has been successfully used in various domains e.g. Information 
Systems (Ahn and Choi 2007), Supply Chain Management (Sha and Che 2005, Akarte et al. 
2001), Public services (Fukuyama and Weber 2002, Mingers et al. 2007, Pastor-Ferrando et al. 
2010), Health (Lee and Kwak 1999, Li et al. 2008), Strategy (Leung et al. 2005), E-learning 
(Tavana 2005), Defence (Wheeler 2005), Maritime Ports (Yeo et al. 2009), and Manufacturing 
(Banuelas and Antony 2006) and safety has not been an exception (Paulos and Apostolakis 
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1998, Linkov et al. 2006, Steele et al. 2009, Saaty 1987, Taghipour et al. 2011). New 
applications integrate AHP with other methods as mathematical programming techniques like , 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), Fuzzy Sets, House of Quality, Genetic Algorithms, Neural 
Networks, SWOT-analysis (Ho and Emrouznejad 2009). This trend is especially visible in the 
safety sector where AHP is combined with goal programming (Bertolini and Bevilacqua 2006) 
Multi Attribute Utility Theory (Karydas and Gifun 2006), Bayesian analysis (Cagno et al. 2000, 
Carnero 2006), Bayesian belief networks (Ha and Seong 2004), Failure Mode Effect and 
Criticality Analysis Technique (FMECA) (Lopez et al. 2010), Success Likelihood Index Method 
(SLIM) (Park and Lee 2008), Fuzzy CREAM (Marseguerra et al. 2007), Fuzzy logic (Yang et al. 
2009), Vector Projection Method (Chen and Cai 2003), Multivariate Regression Analysis 
(Mallor et al. 2008), Probability Risk Assessment (PRA) (Li et al. 2009) and Selective Attention 
Effectiveness (Ha and Seong 2009). In this paper, we will describe in sections 3.4, a new 
integration of AHP with CTA. CTA produces a logical combination of basic events and 
measures the severity of the crisis. Then, AHP calculates, in the constructed crisis tree, the 
criticality of each basic event in order to decide where urgent safety actions are needed.  
AHP has the advantage of permitting a hierarchical structure of the problem, which provides 
users with a better focus on specific criteria and sub-criteria when allocating weights. The 
decision goal is located on top of the hierarchy. The children of the tree are the criteria and sub-
criteria to be satisfied by each alternative. The leaves on this hierarchy are the alternatives to be 
considered. At the exception of the leaves, the AHP structure is similar to the one discussed for 
CTA i.e. the goal is the undesired event and the criteria are the basic events. Therefore, AHP can 
easily be adopted to measure the criticality of the basic events.  
 
The main feature of AHP is the pairwise comparison of criteria at the same hierarchic level. The 
method of pairwise comparisons provides more accurate results than direct evaluations, 
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primarily due to the fact that the decision maker is asked to concentrate only on two elements at 
a time (Millet 1997, Ishizaka et al. 2011, Elliott 2010). These comparisons are entered in a 
positive reciprocal matrix, A. The eigenvalue method is used to calculate the priorities from this 
matrix:  
 A · p = λmax · p  (1) 
 where A  is the comparison matrix 
   p is the priorities vector 
   λmax is the maximal eigenvalue 
In order to declare the comparison matrix consistent enough for calculating credible priorities, it 
must pass a consistency check (2). Consistency Ratio (CR) is defined as:- 
 CR = CI/RI, (2) 
 where  RI is the Random Index (the average CI of 500 randomly filled matrices) 
  CI is the Consistency Index 
 CI = (λmax – n)/(n-1), (3) 
 where  n  is the dimension of the matrix 
  λmax is the maximal eigenvalue 
If CR is less than 10%, then the matrix is considered to have an acceptable level of 
inconsistency. If not, the decision makers are asked to revise their judgments in order to improve 
the consistency level. 
Output: Prioritisation of the criticality of basics events. 
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2.5. Knapsack optimisation 
Resources allocation problem, also called the knapsack problem, is a combinatorial optimization 
problem to assign the available resources to different activities. AHP has been used in 
conjunction with linear programming to determine the best combination of alternatives that has 
the largest sum of priority within the given constraints. The priorities calculated in AHP serves 
as coefficients of the objective function of the linear programming problem. Some example of 
applications are the allocation of a budget to different departments (Saaty et al. 2003), the 
optimisation of human resource allocation, the allocation of staff to training programs and the 
hiring of problem (Saaty et al. 2007), the calculation of exploitation oil quotas (Xiao et al. 1998), 
the optimisation of quantity order from several suppliers (Kokangul and Susuz 2009, 
Ghodsypour and O'Brien 1998, Özgen et al. 2008, Ting and Cho 2008) and the allocation of 
warehouses in a logistics distribution network (Ho et al. 2010).  
 
In crisis management, the criteria for security must be given priority over all other criteria during 
the cost to benefit analysis. Security is the primary objective to be achieved that cannot be traded 
off against any other objective. For example, it would be a deadly mistake to prefer profitability 
against safety.  
In the following knapsack problem, the model is formulated to select an optimal set of events to 
be secured under the condition of having limited resources. The objective function is to 
maximise security, in which the AHP priorities are incorporated as weighting factors. The events 
with higher priority have higher criticality. The problem is binary in nature since an event is 
either secured or unsecured. Mathematically the binary knapsack problem can be formulated as: 
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maximise  
n
i
ii ecr
 (4)
 
subject to :  
n
i
ii ec ≤ f 
 ei {0, 1} 
where: ei event i 
 cri  criticality of event i 
 ci  cost of event i 
 f available funds 
Output: Optimised resource allocation. 
3. CASE STUDY OF THE BHOPAL GAS DISASTER 
3.1. Introduction 
In this section, we will first analyse the complex set of organisational and technological factors 
that lead to the Bhopal disaster (section 3.2). Each basic event will be numbered in bold, used 
for constructing a crisis fault tree (section 3.3) and then prioritised with the AHP method 
(section 3.4). Finally, a safety investment will be optimised (section 3.5). 
3.2. Bhopal disaster structuring 
The problem structuring has been performed through secondary data analysis. Since the 
literature on the Bhopal disaster is very rich, a direct contact with the stakeholders is not 
necessary. Also, the disaster happened about 30 years ago, so collecting the primary data seems 
inappropriate as memories have faded and key persons may have disappeared. A secondary data 
analysis on the Bhopal disaster gives also the possibility to triangulate multiple sources. 
Moreover, the case can be easily checked by other researchers (Saunders et al. 2009). In order to 
understand how the crisis tree diagrams in Figure 3 and Figure 4 are derived, this section 
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describes each event that caused the disaster. They are indentified in the rich verbal description 
by bold numbers that can also be found in the CTA diagrams given in Figure 3 and Figure 4 or 
in the RBD in Figure 5.  
3.2.1. Disaster background 
In 1969, the multi-national Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) established a small Indian 
subsidiary (Union Carbide India Ltd – UCIL) to manufacture pesticides called ‘sevin’ in Bhopal 
– a city located in the centre of India with a population of approximately 1.4 million. The Indian 
plant offered competitive advantages due to cheap labour and low operating costs, and an access 
to a rapidly expanding market. Moreover, UCIL was able to exploit the country’s lax 
environmental and safety regulations as India was striving to attract large corporations to 
industrialise the nation. The new Bhopal facility was advertised as being the facility constructed 
based on the twenty years of experience learnt from the UCC facility located in West Virginia, 
USA.  
 
On the 3
rd
 December 1984, Bhopal city suffered from the major disaster originated from the 
Union Carbide Plant (4.8 miles away). Poisonous gases were released into the atmosphere, such 
as the Methyl Isocyanate (MIC). MIC was originally used in World War I and it attacks the 
‘wet’ parts of our bodies, such as the eyes, mouth and throat. It enters the lungs where it reacts 
with bodily fluids drowning a person from the inside. Three thousand persons were killed 
immediately and many other lost their lives later (an up to date figure states 20,000). 
Approximately 120,000 people are still suffering from serious ill health. Considering this huge 
figure, the Bhopal gas disaster is considered to be one of the worst man-made disasters. 
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3.2.2. Installation 
In 1972, a UCC internal report recommended that new plant should be built with the same 
standard as the West Virginia plant. The UCC engineers oversaw the design, construction and 
operation until the end of 1982, along with their technical support and safety reviews. After that, 
the Indian facility underwent cost cutting programmes in its design and construction that 
eventually made it incomparable to its Western counterpart. For example:- 
 Stainless steel piping was replaced with carbon steel pipe, which is more corrosive (1) 
(Pareek 1999, Chouhan 2005). 
 The safety devices in Western plants were automatically controlled with back-up devices 
– at Bhopal, these were manually controlled (2) (Chouhan 2005). 
 In similar Western plants, computerised early warning systems sensed leaks, monitored 
their rates and concentrations and were linked to a telephone system to automatically dial 
out alerts (Varma and Varma 2005). In Bhopal, there did not exist any emergency 
planning measures (3). 
 In Bhopal, there was no extra vent gas scrubber (VGS) installed, resulting in no 
redundancy (4). The equivalent plant in the USA had four VGS (Chouhan 2005). 
 Similarly, only one flare tower was installed yet again resulting in no redundancy at the 
Bhopal facility (5). The equivalent plant in the USA had two (Chouhan 2005). 
 In Bhopal, no unit storage tank to check the purity was installed between the gas 
manufacture and the large storage tank (6). The US plant had one (Chouhan 2005). 
 Unlike the normal practice in other plants, Methyl Iso Cyanate was stored in large 
batches (7) (Cassels 1993, Gupta 2002, Aro et al. 1985).  
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None of the main safety features of the plant were efficient due to their design. Moreover on the 
night of the incident, none were operational due to an under maintenance schedule (due to under 
staffing). 
 
At the local level, no emergency planning was undertaken prior to the commissioning of the 
plant. In the US, emergency planning is immediate and involved all of the emergency services 
and a public broadcasting system.  
3.2.3. Precursors leading to the disaster 
As the plant was losing money between 1980 and 1984, the workforce was reduced dramatically 
with no clear investment in technology to warrant this reduction (8) (Aro et al. 1985, Varma and 
Varma 2005). The staff trainings were given only at the time when the facility was opened. No 
further training was virtually provided since then (9). Information on the hazards of using MIC 
was kept minimal. With the high personnel turnover in Bhopal those years, very few of those 
trained people were still working in the facility (Lees 1996, Aro et al. 1985, Varma and Varma 
2005). 
The basic operations of the plant were further compromised by management decisions to operate 
the plant either outside its designed operating parameters or to implement revised processes to 
ensure continued production whilst essential components of the system were defective. These 
defects had the potential to make a negative impact on the safety/integrity of the plant. In fact, 
prior to the disaster, some of the operating incidents resulting in plant workers being killed or 
injured along with minor releases of toxic gases had already been reported to UCC in May 1982, 
that stirred them to send a team of US experts in order to inspect the Bhopal plant as part of a 
safety inspection. Their report, which was passed to UC’s management in the USA, indicated 
that there was “a serious potential for sizeable releases of toxic materials either due to 
equipment failure, operating problems or maintenance problems thus requiring various changes 
[Postprint version] Please cite as : Ishizaka A, Labib A, A Hybrid and Integrated Approach to Evaluate and Prevent 
Disasters, Journal of the Operational Research Society, 65(10), 1475–1489, 2013 
 
17 
 
to reduce the danger of the plant”. There is no evidence that these recommendations were ever 
been implemented (10) (Gupta 2002, Weir 1987, Aro et al. 1985). 
3.2.4. Direct Causes of the Accident 
The production of a deadly cloud was produced as a consequence of a cheap engineering 
solution to a known maintenance problem. A “jumper line” connected a relief valve header to a 
pressure vent header enabling water from a routine washing operation to pass to the gas storage 
tank 610 (11). Normally, the lines are isolated by a slip blind (a physical barrier inserted into the 
pipe). Line washing is the duty of an operator, while installing the slip blind is the responsibility 
of maintenance. However the second shift maintenance position had been eliminated some days 
earlier and no worker was told to insert the slip blind. The operator could not see the slip blind 
holder from his location and had no way to know that it was not there. The ingress of water in 
the tank created an uncontrollable runaway exothermic reaction. The increased temperature 
converted liquid MIC into gas. The reaction products passed through the process vent header to 
the jumper line, to the relief valve vent header, onto the vent gas scrubber and finally to the 
atmosphere through the atmospheric vent line. The toxic gases were discharged for 2 hours and 
15 minutes (Kletz 2001, Aro et al. 1985, Varma and Mulay 2009, Varma and Varma 2005). 
 
In process industries, accidents may occur due to two fundamental reasons; either due to lack of 
design integrity of the plant or due to failure in operation. At Bhopal, there was evidence 
attributed to both reasons. The release of toxic gases was assisted by the following defects and 
lapses in standard operating procedures which could have easily been averted in many instances:  
 The storage gas tank number 610 was filled beyond recommended capacity (7). Functional 
contents gauges should have provided warning and the process halted until rectified 
(Shrivastava 1987, Aro et al. 1985, Varma and Varma 2005).  
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 The reserve storage tank, which was supposed to receive gas in case of emergency, was 
already filled (14). In fact, operators were not even sure how much MIC was in the tank 
because many gauges in the plant were unreliable (15). Any production should have been 
halted until the tank was again empty. This should have been a formal requirement: a “hold 
point” in the control process, before any production is allowed to continue (Cassels 1993, 
Shrivastava 1987, Aro et al. 1985). 
 The blow down valve of the 610 tank was being repaired at the time of the accident, 
consequently each end was open (16) (Aro et al. 1985). The tank should have been removed 
from service until repaired.  
 The danger alarm sirens used for warning the adjacent residential communities was switched 
off after 5 minutes in accordance with the revised company safety practices (17) (Lees 1996, 
Chouhan 2005). This signal was ignored because minor leaks were common (Varma and 
Varma 2005). This clearly highlights the importance of emergency procedures to be in place 
and continually reviewed. 
 The plant superintendent did not notify external agencies of the accident and initially denied 
the accident had occurred (18) (Pareek 1999, Bogard 1989, Aro et al. 1985). This was a clear 
negligence of the management and typified the poor health and safety culture within the plant 
(10). 
 The civic authorities did not know what actions to take because no emergency procedures 
existed. Moreover, they were uninformed of the hazardous materials stored in the plant (3) 
(Weir 1987, Shrivastava 1987, Gupta 2002, Aro et al. 1985, Varma and Varma 2005). This 
issue was due to the lack of good communication and established emergency procedures with 
local agencies and emergency services.  
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 Gauges measuring temperature and pressure in the various parts of the facility, including the 
crucial gas storage tanks, were so notoriously unreliable that workers ignored early signs (15) 
(Weir 1987, Lees 1996, Varma and Varma 2005). The company should have had a robust 
maintenance regime which should have prevented this, coupled with a safety culture which 
should have questioned any unsafe conditions (Sorensen 2002). 
 The refrigeration unit keeping gas at low temperatures, and therefore making it less likely of 
reacting and vaporizing, had been shut off to save money (19) (Cassels 1993, Weir 1987, 
Gupta 2002, Aro et al. 1985, Chouhan 2005). The management clearly did not demonstrate a 
commitment to safety and process guarding. It was a violation of established procedures. 
The failings below are attributable to design deficiencies. The reduction of safety protection 
devices in order to maximise profits was possible because peer reviews of designs by local 
safety engineers was non-existent. 
 The vent gas scrubber, designed to neutralise any escaping gas, had been shut off for 
maintenance (20). Moreover, supervisors though it was not necessary when MIC was only 
stored and not produced. Even if it had been operative, post disaster inquiries revealed that 
the maximum pressure it could have handled was only one quarter of the pressure actually 
reached in the accident (21) (Weir 1987, Aro et al. 1985, Varma and Varma 2005, Chouhan 
2005).  
 The flare tower, designed to burn off escaping gas from the scrubber, was turned off, waiting 
for the replacement of a corroded piece of pipe (22). The tower, however, was inadequately 
designed for its task, as it was capable of handling only a quarter of the volume of the gas 
released (23) (Weir 1987, Aro et al. 1985, Varma and Varma 2005, Chouhan 2005). 
 The water curtain, designed to neutralise any remaining gas, was too short to reach the top of 
the flare tower where the gas billowed out (24). A larger water spray system was 
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recommended in 1982 but was never installed (Weir 1987, Shrivastava 1987, Aro et al. 1985, 
Varma and Varma 2005, Chouhan 2005). 
 The warning system was ineffective: the alarm on the storage tank failed to signal the 
increase in temperature on the night of the disaster (15) (Cassels, 1993). 
From this rich verbal structured problem, a crisis tree analysis (CTA) is built in the next section. 
3.3. Bhopal Crisis Tree Analysis 
The way events came together on the night of the 2
nd
 December 1984 is quite unique. But the 
underlying causes are not unique. According to the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions and the International Federation of Chemical, Energy, and General Workers (ICFTU-
ICEF), the factors that led to the Bhopal disaster are common (Aro et al. 1985). In this section, a 
crisis tree analysis will map the root causes of the disaster. Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the crisis 
tree analysis of Bhopal disaster. The release of toxic gas can be triggered by any of the following 
causes:  
A. Ineffective workforce 
B. Poor plant design specification 
C. Poor plant maintenance 
D. Inappropriate management decisions 
A combination of these causes will amplify the amount of gas released; therefore a 
REVOLVING gate has been used. In Bhopal, all four items have contributed simultaneously to 
the gas release, which has magnified the disaster. The next paragraphs will detail the main 
events of Figure 3 and Figure 4: 
A. The workforce was ineffective because it did receive an appropriate training OR it had a 
poor health and safety culture. 
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B. Chemical plants have a large number of redundant security systems that should stop or at 
least contain a gas release. Each system is autonomous and efficient by itself, which justify 
an AND gate. Unfortunately, in Bhopal, none of them were operative. 
C. The leakage of water in the MIC tank 610, was due to poor plant maintenance actions.  
D. Any inappropriate management decision would have potentially led to gas release. The 
accumulation of them amplified the crisis. 
E. The flare tower is ineffective if it is turned off OR incapable to deal with the amount of gas 
released OR no redundancy has been added (two flare towers would have been able to deal 
with the large amount of gas). 
F. The vent gas scrubber is ineffective if it is turned off OR incapable to deal with the amount 
of gas released OR not redundant (two vent gas scrubber would have been able to deal with 
the large amount of gas). 
G. A slip blind was not installed during the pipe cleaning to prevent the leakage of water AND 
nobody checked if it was installed. 
H. The emergency is deficient if the alarm sirens are turned off OR the incident is not notified 
OR emergency procedures do not exist. 
 
[Postprint version] Please cite as : Ishizaka A, Labib A, A Hybrid and Integrated Approach to Evaluate and Prevent 
Disasters, Journal of the Operational Research Society, 65(10), 1475–1489, 2013 
 
22 
 
Release of toxic 
gas into 
atmosphere 
A – Ineffective 
workforce
B – Poor plant 
design 
specification 
D – Inappropriate 
management 
decisions 
C – Poor plant 
maintenance 
E – Ineffective 
flare tower
F – Ineffective 
vent gas scrubber
9. Reduction of 
staff’s safety 
training
10. Poor health 
and safety culture
5. No redundancy
23. Incapable of 
dealing with the 
quantity of gas 
released
4. No redundancy
21. Incapable of 
dealing with the 
quantity of gas 
released
6. No unit tank 
storage
Go to 
figure 2
11. Substitute 
engineering 
solution used 
« jumper line »
G – Poor 
maintenance 
procedures
15. Defective 
gauges not 
repaired
12. Slip blind not 
installed
13. Presence of 
slip blind not 
checked
22. Flare tower 
turned off
2. No 
computerized 
warning systems
20. Vent gas 
scrubber turned off
16. Defective blow 
down valve in MIC 
tank 610
1. Stainless pipe 
replaced by 
carbon steel
24. Ineffective 
water spray 
system
 
Figure 3: Crisis tree diagram of the Bhopal case 
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D – Inappropriate 
management 
decisions 
19. Refrigeration 
unit shut down
H – Deficient 
emergency 
response
8. Plant manning 
level reduced
14. Permission to 
use reserve MIC 
storage tank
7.Plant operating 
outside designed 
parameters
18. No notification 
of incidents
3. No emergency 
procedures
17. Alarm sirens 
turned off
 
Figure 4: Crisis tree branch “inappropriate management decisions” 
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Figure 5: Reliability Block Diagram of the Bhopal case 
 
In the next section, this crisis tree is transferred into AHP, where the criticality of each basic 
events is prioritised. 
3.4. Quantification of the occurrence of basic events with AHP 
In a fault tree diagram, the next step would be to give a quantitative evaluation of each basic 
event. If the rate of occurrence and fault duration for all basic events are known, the statistical 
dependency of each basic event can be calculated and the statistical expectation of the top event 
can be determined using, for example, Bayesian theory. In a crisis tree diagram, this technique is 
not applicable because we lack enough amount of pertinent data (since crisis are rare). 
Moreover, some basic events are purely qualitative e.g. untrained staff. Therefore, in order to 
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quantify the most critical basic events, we use AHP, which can evaluate both the quantitative 
and the qualitative attributes on same scale based on inputs from one or several experts (see 
section 2.4). The pairwise comparisons have been entered in Expert Choice software by the 
authors based on their experience in maintenance, informed by the literature of the Bhopal case 
and the opinion of an expert in asset management. Calculated criticality with (1) for each event 
is given in Figure 6. Note that the hierarchical structure in Figure 6, corresponds to the trees in 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 but in a sideway representation, where the top level of the hierarchy is at 
the left side of the figure. The sum of the weights of each contributing factor at any level in the 
hierarchy adds to unity. These weights (priorities) are indicated in the figure and are driven 
through a pairwise judgement as explained in section 2.4. 
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Figure 6: Criticality of each event 
 
The criticality of each basic event is used in next section as the weights of importance of the 
variables in the optimisation function. 
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3.5. Safety investment optimisation 
In May 1982, a three man team from UCC in the USA inspected the Bhopal plant. In their 
report, they found a number of major concerns but no action was taken. In this section, we will 
imagine a more conscientious management, and explain how the disaster would have been 
avoided with an optimal investment.  
As a part of an illustrative example, we have made some estimates on the costs for avoiding any 
basic event in the crisis tree diagram (Table 5). Rational justification and literature source for 
costs estimates are given in Table 5. As costs figures are historical and hypothetical (e.g. 
depends on the supplier at the time), they can only represent rough estimates. However, this is 
not an issue as the purpose of the exercise is only to illustrate the methodology.  
The basic events 7, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18 are due to inappropriate decisions; no investment can 
directly prevent them. The basic events 11, 16, 15 are part of the wider problem of poor plant 
maintenance. Their costs are groups under the heading C. Costs are given for a 5 year period. 
 
# Basic event Justification Cost [m$] 
1 Stainless pipe replaced by 
carbon steel 
Estimated assumption 2.25 
2 No computerized warning 
system 
Immediately after the disaster in India, 
Union Carbide shut down the MIC plant 
in West Virginia to implement a $5 
million new computerized warning 
system (Weir 1987) 
5 
3 No emergency procedures Estimated assumption of 3 man-months 
work 
0.01 
4 No VGS redundancy Price of a new VGS from Northeast 0.1 
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Controls Incorporated
2
  
5 No flare tower redundancy According to (Stone et al. 1995) 0.05 
6 No unit tank storage Estimated assumption 0.1 
7 Plant operating outside 
parameters 
Inappropriate decision - 
8 Plant manning reduced Operating staff decreased of 13 persons 
(Chouhan 2005). Estimated yearly wage 
10’000$.  
5 · 13 · 10’000 = 0.65m$ 
0.65 
9 Reduction of staff’s safety 
training 
Training was reduced from 18 month 
staff/year to 1 month staff/year (Chouhan 
2005); assuming training costs of 
100£/day 
5 · 30 · 17 · 100 = 0.255 m$ 
0.255 
10 Poor health and safety 
culture 
Long process difficult to cost. Awareness 
actions, transfer to other sites, 
trainings,…etc. 
0.255 
11 Substitute engineering 
solution used « jumper 
line » 
Part of poor plant maintenance See C 
12 Slip blind not installed Inappropriate decision - 
13 Presence of slip blind not 
checked 
Inappropriate decision - 
14 Permission to use reserve Inappropriate decision - 
                                                 
2
 http://www.nciweb.net/wet_scrubbers.htm 
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MIC storage tank 
15 Defective gauge not 
repaired 
Part of poor plant maintenance See C 
16 Defective blow down valve Part of poor plant maintenance See C 
17 Alarm sirens turned off Inappropriate decision - 
18 No notification of incidents Inappropriate decision - 
19 Refrigeration unit shut 
down 
20$/day (Chouhan 2005) 
5 · 20 · 365 = 0.0365m$ 
0.0365 
20 VGS turned off Estimated cost saving of shutting it 0.01 
21 VGS incapable of dealing 
with the gas quantity 
Estimated cost of redesign 0.025  
22 Flare tower tuned off Estimated cost saving of shutting it 0.01 
23 Flare tower incapable of 
dealing with the gas 
quantity 
Estimated cost of redesign 0.025 
24 Ineffective water spray 
system 
Estimated cost of redesign 0.025 
C Poor plant maintenance Estimated assumption 0.5 
Table 5: Cost of each basic event over a 5 year period 
 
A. Secure ineffective workforce  
  9. Reduction of staff’s safety training costs  0.255    
 10. Poor health and safety culture 0.255   
 Total 0.51 m$ 
E. Ineffective flare tower 
 5. No flare tower redundancy 0.05 
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 22. Flare tower tuned off 0.01 
 23. Flare tower incapable of dealing with the gas quantity 0.025 
  Total 0.085 m$ 
F. Ineffective VGS 
 4. No VGS redundancy  0.1 
 20. VGS turned off  0.01 
 21. VGS incapable of dealing with the gas quantity  0.025 
  Total 0.135 m$ 
B. Poor plant design specification 
 1. Stainless pipe replaced by carbon steel  2.25 
 2. No computerized warning system  5 
 6. No unit tank storage  0.1 
 24. Ineffective water spray system  0.025 
 E. Ineffective flare tower  0.085 
 F. Ineffective VGS  0.135 
  Total 7.595 m$ 
H. Deficient emergency response 
 3. No emergency procedures 0.01  
 17. Alarm sirens turned off 0  
 18. No notification of incidents 0 
  Total 0.01 m$ 
C. Secure poor plant maintenance Total  0.5 m$ 
D. Secure inappropriate management decisions 
 7. Plant operating outside parameters 0 
 8. Plant manning reduced 0.65  
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 14. Permission to use reserve MIC storage tank 0 
 19. Refrigeration unit shut down 0.0365 
 H. Deficient emergency response 0.01 
  Total 0.6965 m$ 
Table 6: Costs by event 
 
Table 6 groups costs by events. The total cost for securing all events is 9.3015 m$. What 
happens if the funding is lower than the total costs? Less critical events according to the AHP 
analysis will be secured later. 
As an example, we assume a safety investment of 6m$. Our crisis tree diagram (Figure 3 and 
Figure 4) is our starting point. In order to avoid any disaster, each entry of an OR and 
REVOLVING gate, and at least one entry of an AND gate must be safe. Therefore, our 
investment must first secure all OR and REVOLVING gates and then an optimal calculation is 
made for the AND gates. In our case, a 6m$ budget allow us to secure entirely events A, C and 
D but not event B. A safety budget of 4.2935m$ remains to secure event B. What will be the 
events to consider for maximising the security? To answer this question, we are using the 
knapsack algorithm (section 2.5) with the criticality factor calculated in the section 3.7 (Table 7).  
  x1. 
Stainless 
pipe 
xE. 
Ineffective 
flare tower 
x2.             
No 
computerized 
warning 
x6.         
No unit 
tank 
storage  
xF. 
Ineffective 
VGS  
x24. 
Ineffective 
Water 
spray 
system 
Criticality  0.045  0.123  0.123  0.095  0.49  0.123 
Costs  2.25  0.085  5  0.1  0.135  0.025 
Table 7: Costs and criticality of each event 
 
The knapsack model is given by: 
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maximise 0.045 · x1 + 0.123 · xE + 0.123 · x2 + 0.095 · x6 + 0.49 · xF + 0.123 · x24 
subject to 2.25 · x1 + 0.085 · xE + 5 · x2 + 0.1 · x6 + 0.135 · xF + 0.025 · x24 ≤ 4.2935 
 x1, xE, x2, x6, xF, x24 {0, 1} 
 
In our case, the optimal solution, calculated with the Excel solver, requires to secure all the 
events Xi at the exception of the computerized warning system (X2). 
4. CONCLUSION 
Several methods have been developed to evaluate and mitigate risks (e.g. FTA, AHP, RBD, etc). 
Some of these methods have received much attention due to their simplicity, ease of use and 
visual display. However, all such methods have their limitations, when used on their own, due to 
their inherent assumptions. It would be a dramatic mistake to try to manipulate the disaster 
modelling in order to fit it in the method instead of the vice versa.  
We have demonstrated that Fault Tree Analysis can be adapted in Crisis Tree Analysis in order 
to map a crisis with the introduction of the revolving gate. Similarly, Reliability Block Diagram 
can also map crisis with hyper-blocks as the counterpart of the revolving gate. The AHP method 
can be used to quantify events criticality. Their flexibility allows their integration into a new 
hybrid method.  
In our case study, four methods have been used in conjunction. This hybrid method permits 
more realistic and sound decisions than any method used in isolation. This approach has been 
illustrated with the Bhopal disaster, where the budget allocation problem with their many 
subjective and objective risk evaluations has been optimised in order to maximise the safety and 
by consequence minimise the disaster likelihood. This approach allows taking rational and 
justifiable decisions, even to shut down a plant if the safety resources are not sufficient. It is 
therefore a generic and flexible approach, which can be easily used to prevent disasters in any 
field. 
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Our hybrid model can also be applied to various applications with different costing target such 
as the following: 
- to determine the minimal budget for a minimal acceptable security, 
- to determine the budget for a security with only one or n redundant systems,  
- to plan a rolling investment instead of a one off investment, 
- to take into account flexible costs, 
- to incorporate a time factor, with regular maintenance and depreciation. 
 
This model can be useful not only for industries but also for insurance companies in order to 
calculate insurance premium, or the defence industry where crisis management is of great 
importance. 
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